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Abstract
Debates about the possibility of a near-term maximum in world oil production
have become increasingly prominent over the past decade, with the focus often
being on the quantication of geologically available and technologically recover-
able amounts of oil in the ground. Economically, the important parameter is not
a physical limit to resources in the ground, but whether market price signals
and costs of extraction will indicate the eciency of extracting conventional
or nonconventional resources as opposed to making substitutions over time for
other fuels and (mainly, transportation) technologies. Here we present a hybrid
approach to the peak-oil debate, using two models, in which the use of logis-
tic curves for cumulative production are supplemented with data on projected
extraction costs and historical rates of capacity increase to provide indicative ev-
idence for a possible eective peak in world production of oil, while not denying
the presence of large quantities of oil in the ground. Even with foresight, rates
of production of new nonconventional resources are likely to not be sucient to
make up for declines in availability of conventional oil.
Keywords: peak oil, logistic curves, extraction costs
1. Introduction
A vigorous debate about the extent of the potential world petroleum re-
source has been carried out over the past several decades. On the one hand,
concerns about lack of supplies have been expressed since the beginning of the
petroleum age, whereas consumption has continued to increase (with few excep-
tions) for one and a half centuries; on the other hand, it is clear that petroleum
represents a nite resource in the ground, and that there will necessarily be a
production peak followed by a decline toward zero production at some point in
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time. Most famously, petroleum geologist M. King Hubbert predicted in the
late 1950s that production of oil in the continental United States would reach
a maximum in about 1970 (Hubbert, 1956). In 1956, when Hubbert rst made
this startling prediction U.S. oil production had been increasing by roughly
7%/year for nearly a century, and indeed, for some time afterwards, continued
to rise (Hubbert, 1981). Looking back, however, production of oil in the U.S.
did reach a maximum in 1970, and even with the added production of oil from
the Alaskan North Slope and from deepwater sources in the Gulf of Mexico, has
never exceeded the level of production in that year. One might say that this
prediction by Hubbert, due in equal parts to mathematical analysis and deep
knowledge of petroleum geology, marked the beginning of the \peak oil" story.
Although he was not taken very seriously at the time, with hindsight it is clear
that Hubbert was correct, at least in the broad outlines of his projections.
The intensity of this debate increases at times of higher oil prices, such as
during the mid- to late-1970s. Starting with an article in 1998 by Campbell and
Laherrere (Campbell and Laherrere, 1998) and building over the past several
years, serious eort has been directed toward answering several basic questions
about oil supplies. First and foremost, is there a real danger of arriving at a
supply-limited shortfall in either conventional petroleum itself, or more gener-
ally, in liquid fuels needed for (mainly) transportation? An interesting recent
development has been an acknowledgement of the potential for a current peak
in oil production on the part of respected mainstream sources (IEA, 2010; Kerr,
2011). A second question is whether there is enough solid data available to make
a determination of the extent of in situ resources and the potential for economic
conversion from resources to producible reserves (IEA, 2008). A related ques-
tion is that of the ecacy of economic signals in ensuring both sucient supply
and in guiding markets toward substitutes for conventional petroleum, should
that resource indeed be unable to fulll worldwide demand. Also in the realm
of economic analysis is the question of the feedback between potentially rising
prices for liquid fuels and consumer demand.
It is our aim in this paper to examine the questions of petroleum reserves
and resources and production using logistic curves. Although this is the general
approach taken by Hubbert and many others since, we present here an analy-
sis in terms of dierent regions and resource types, with the goal of modestly
disaggregating conventional and non-conventional resources to the extent that
we can construct a model that allows us to investigate some of the dynam-
ics of production of dierent resources, both current and future. We extend
the Hubbert-curve technique to include some basic economic information in
the form of estimated extraction costs for dierent types of conventional and
non-conventional oil resources. The specic questions addressed here, related
to those posed above, are the following: Can the logistic function be used to
project the ultimately recoverable resource (URR; symbol, Q1), and if so, under
what circumstances (Section 2); what constraints are set on rates of extraction,
given the nite resource size and historical precedent (Section 3); how might
one expect average petroleum extraction costs to change with time, and how
do average costs compare to marginal extraction costs (Section 4); and given
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past and current patterns of production for various resources (either regional or
type, as dened below), will there be enough exibility going forward to meet
growing world demand for liquid fuels (Section 5)? In Section 6 we will discuss
our results and conclude.
The key results from our analysis are that, although non-conventional petroleum
resources may be very large, historical evidence for growth rates in production
indicate that there will likely be near-term supply-driven constraints to resource
availability. Furthermore our construction of extraction cost curves as a function
of time (or cumulative production) help explain the observation that the cost
of the marginal (actually produced) barrel of oil, and therefore the price of oil,
may be high although relatively large quantities of low-cost resources are still
being produced. Put another way, the marginal cost curve diers qualitatively
from those often presented in investigations that assume a particular functional
form for the extraction costs, based on extraction of rst lower-cost resources,
followed sequentially by increasingly costly resources.
2. Logistic Function and Variations
It is dicult to make a projection of future oil production patterns based
solely on the history of past production. Hubbert used a simple, logical curve-
tting technique to make his estimate, with one of the input parameters being
an estimate of the ultimately recoverable resource (URR), which had to be
obtained through other means. It should be noted here that Hubbert did not
simply take the sum of past production and proven reserves to make his estimate
of URR. It was perfectly clear to him that new elds would be discovered and
that technological advances would lead to improved recovery in existing elds
(Hubbert, 1956); we follow that same strategy in this work.
Hubbert (Hubbert, 1981) used a reasonable mathematical formulation that
also has a useful physical interpretation. The logistic, or Verhulst, function is
often used to describe growth in a system subject to a nite capacity or resource.
The mathematical form of the logistic equation is given by
dQ
dt
= bQ

1  Q
Q1

(1)
where Q is the cumulative production of oil up to a given date, Q1 is the
ultimately recoverable amount of oil, and dQdt is the rate of extraction. The
initial (exponential) rate of growth of cumulative production is described by the
constant b. The logistic equation describes growth of a quantity that initially
increases exponentially. As the ultimate limit to the resource becomes an im-
portant factor in production, extraction becomes more dicult, and the rate of
extraction decreases. Relevant to the current work, since there is an ultimate
limit to the amount of oil in the ground, at some point in time the rate of
production will go to zero.
The solution to the Verhulst equation is given by
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Q(t) =
Q1
1 +

Q1 Q(0)
Q(0)

e bt
=
Q1
1 + ae bt
(2)
with three undetermined constants that can in principle be found by comparison
with actual data. An alternative formulation of the solution to the Verhulst
equation is to write the cumulative and yearly production in terms of the time
of peak production,
Q(t) =
Q1
1 + e b(t tp)
(3)
P (t) =
bQ1e b(t tp) 
1 + e b(t tp)
2 (4)
where tp is the year of peak production; this form for the cumulative and yearly
production functions will also be useful in what follows.
In reality, drawing conclusions from data t to the logistic function is not
trivial, especially because economic and political factors in the 1970s and 1980s
led to a noticeable readjustment to trends in oil production in all areas of the
world. In Fig. 1 are shown the data for cumulative oil production in the
U.S. along with two logistic curves. By carrying out a nonlinear least-squares
t (NLSF) to the data from 1859 through 2010, one nds the upper curve,
corresponding to parameters Q1 = 1952, b = 0:065  0:001, tp = 1971  1.
However, if the data to be t are limited to production from 1859-1970, the best
t parameters are Q1 = 152 5, b = 0:072 0:001, tp = 1964.
Hubbert's 1981 paper (Hubbert, 1981) used data not available at the time
of his original 1956 presentation. His data along with several other sets of
t parameters are summarized in Table 1. Hubbert predicted an ultimately
recoverable reserve of about 170 Gb for the U.S. lower 48; it now appears that
the trend will lead to an amount closer to 200 Gb, which was the upper limit
of his probable range. The most striking feature of the data and t parameters
given in Table 1 is the strong increase in expected ultimately recoverable oil
until the peak of production had actually passed in 1970. After the peak (or
equivalently, after the inection point in the logistic curve shown in Fig. 1) the
value for Q1 changes only slightly with the length of data set considered. Of
course, this point is problematic since one of the main reasons that one wishes
to use the logistic equation approach is to help determine when the peak of
production will be reached, and how much oil will ultimately be available.
Hubbert did not consider o-shore deep-water oil or some of the enhanced
oil-recovery techniques that have been since applied, data that are included in
the above. And of course, Alaskan North Slope oil is not included here, as that
resource was not part of Hubbert's initial calculation. In fact, one argument used
against the concept of \peak oil" is that there will always be another source of
oil or replacement energy when the economic and technological conditions are
ripe. However, as we shall see below, even these additional discoveries did not
alter the fact that total U.S. production has never superseded the 1970 peak.
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Figure 1: Cumulative U.S. oil production and predictions, in billions of barrels. The two
logistic curves are based on predictions by M. King Hubbert (Ref. (Hubbert, 1981)) and from
current trends (URR of 195 billion barrels).
The conclusion can be drawn that in the early, exponential growth stages
of resource production, it is dicult to determine the nal trajectory of the
production curve based on the logistic cumulative production model. It is only
when cumulative production reaches a signicant fraction of the limiting URR
that the two curves shown in Fig. 1 separate.
Another approach is to look at the yearly production as a function of time,
eectively, the derivative of the logistic function. We can construct a similar
table to that above, using the logistic function in terms of peak year, tp. From
the results in Table 2 we see that using the yearly production data appears
to give more accurate predictions of both the URR, and especially, the date
Data through Q1(Gb) tp b
2010 195 2 1971  1 0.065 0.001
1990 185 2 1969 1 0.068 0:001
1980 183 5 1969 1 0.068 0:001
1962-1980 170 1500 0.069
Ref. (Hubbert, 1981)
1970 152  5 1964  1 0.0724  0.001
1960 123  6 1959  1 0.077  0.001
Table 1: Logistic function nonlinear least-squares t parameters. Years represent the nal
year of the data set used for the t, with the initial year being 1860.
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of peak production. We note that although the estimates for URR tended to
increase until the peak production year was passed, that increase was relatively
small, on the order of 25% or less. Although both relations contain the same
fundamental information, the fact that Q is an integral of production tends to
hide year-to-year changes; therefore, we will mainly use ts to the derivative of
the logistic function when looking at world oil production.
Data through Q1(Gb) tp b
2009 206 5 1972  1 0.059  0.002
1990 190 5 1970 1 0.065 0:002
1980 195 8 1971 1 0.064 0:003
1970 206  16 1972  3 0.061  0.003
1960 163  19 1966  3 0.068  0.003
Table 2: Logistic function nonlinear least-squares t parameters for yearly production. Years
represent the nal year of the data set used for the t, with the initial year being 1860.
There are two further variants of the logistic curve approach. Both are ob-
tained by eliminating time as a variable, writing the original dierential equation
as
P
Q
= b

1  Q
Q1

(5)
where P = dQdt . If the ratio of yearly production to cumulative production is
plotted as a function of cumulative production, the x-intercept is equal to Q1
and the y-intercept is b. Performing the same set of ts as with the yearly
production curve yields very similar results, as shown in Table 3. Finally, it
is possible to write yearly production as a nonlinear (quadratic) function of
cumulative production,
P = bQ  b Q
2
Q1
(6)
which can also be used to nd the parameters b and Q1. Reynolds (Reynolds,
2002; Reynolds and Baek, 2011) uses this approach, using in the latter paper
an extension to allow for variation in the exponent.
Although the logistic approach has limitations, it does describe at least qual-
itatively the progress of oil production, especially as larger regions are aggre-
gated, and is certain to oer a good approximation for the world as a whole.
In fact, most oil-producing countries in the world have already passed a peak
in output (Sorrell et al., 2010). With the above cautions in mind, we esti-
mate parameters for total world production of crude oil using a nonlinear least-
squares t to historical production data, considering a modest disaggregation.
We distinguish dierent types of oil that are of interest, using the example
of current production, and data from the U.S. Energy Information Adminis-
tration (http://www.eia.doe.gov). Total world oil supply (which would better
be termed \total liquid fuel supply") in 2011 was 87,095,000 barrels per day
6
Data through Q1(Gb) intercept slope
2009 197 4 0.0638  0.0001 -(320 5) 10 6
2000 193 4 0.0644  0.0001 -(330 6) 10 6
1990 190 5 0.0648  0.0001 -(340 8) 10 6
1980 190 7 0.0648  0.0001 -(340 12) 10 6
1970 186  11 0.0650  0.0001 -(350 20) 10 6
1960 172  17 0.0662  0.0001 -(380 36) 10 6
1950 158  36 0.0669  0.0003 -(420 95) 10 6
Table 3: Logistic function linearization least-squares t parameters. Years represent the nal
year of the data set used for the t, with the initial year being 1860. The intercept represents
the initial growth rate b.
(87,095 Mbpd). Of this amount, 8,570 Mbpd is accounted for by natural gas
liquids; due to its dierent production source, we will consider natural gas liq-
uids as part of the total mix of liquid fuels, but based solely on projections for
future production increasing at an exponential rate. Another 2,300 Mbpd of
the world oil supply comes from renery processing gains; again, this will not
be considered further. The category \other liquids" makes up 2100 Mbpd; this
quantity consists of biofuels and liquids from coal; the latter are not included
in our analysis, while biofuels will be treated in the same manner as natural
gas liquids, based on published projections. In other words, we look at world
petroleum supplies, broken into two regions, and then consider the inuence of
future and non-conventional petroleum sources such as unproduced Arctic and
deep-sea oil, enhanced oil recovery (EOR), Canadian oil sands, and oil shales
(kerogen, not to be confused with conventional oil recovered from shale source
rock through hydraulic fracturing). Of the remaining 74,100 Mbpd (27.0 billion
barrels per year, Gb/a) of production, 14.9 Gb/a comes from what we call \Rest
of the world" (ROW), 11.6 Gb/a is from \OPEC" and 0.5 Gb/a comes from
Canadian oil sands. These three regions/sources form the starting point for our
further analysis.
The particular choice resource division is made to enable comparisons to one
of the standard annual compilations of data on oil production, the World Energy
Outlook (WEO) published by the International Energy Agency (IEA) (IEA,
2008). In that work supplies are divided into several categories of both current
and future production; biofuels and natural gas liquids are not part of that mix.
In Fig. 2 a schematic supply curve for both conventional and non-conventional
oil is shown, adapted from Ref. (IEA, 2008). The presentation of resources in
Fig. 2 might at rst lead one to expect that oil resources such as tar sands,
for example, would not be produced until roughly 4000 Gb of total cumulative
production. At present, cumulative production is slightly more than 1150 Gb,
and enhanced oil recovery (EOR), oil sands mining, coal-to-liquids (CTL), gas-
to-liquids (GTL) and even oil shale (kerogen) are all either in production or have
been very recently under serious consideration. We will return to this gure in
Section 4.
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Figure 2: Estimated resource base of various types of conventional and non-conventional
petroleum. For each separate resource, an estimate is shown of the range of extraction costs,
in current dollars, along with the recoverable resource in billions of barrels. The abbreviations
are: MENA - Middle East/North Africa; EOR - Enhanced Oil Recovery (with CO2 and other
methods); GTL - Gas-to-Liquids; CTL - Coal-to-liquids. (After Ref. (IEA, 2008))
We now make use of the logistic function description of past oil production
to make projections about future production. Data for past production come
from three principle sources: the American Petroleum Institute (API, 1959),
Energy Information Administration (EIA, 2011), and BP (BP, 2010). We ex-
tract from past production data three separate categories of petroleum (OPEC
conventional, Rest of the World conventional, Tar sands). Since there are no
commercial mining projects for oil shales at present, this technology is con-
sidered as one for the future. In addition, for this model we treat Arctic and
EOR as future technologies as well. Although the Alaskan North Slope has
been producing oil for decades, and some EOR projects are in production, the
potential referred to by IEA in the 2008 World Energy Outlook is currently
classied as a potential resources; therefore, any current and past production
for these resources are combined with the ROW category. Data for Canadian
oil sands production is taken from data published by the Canadian Association
of Petroleum Producers (CAPP, 2010). Finally, from EIA we obtain crude oil
plus lease condensate data.
Oil production regions are disaggregated only minimally. Multiple logistic
curves have been implemented previously (Nashawi et al., 2010) but without a
clear delineation of how to determine the appropriate number of curves to use;
the closest approach to the one taken here is found in (Gallagher, 2010) We
take two country groupings into consideration: OPEC countries and the rest
of the world (ROW). With this ansatz we proceed to use the logistic yearly-
production function to t ROW production. Resulting parameters for the t
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Figure 3: World conventional oil production, separated into two regions: Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the Rest of the World (ROW). A logistic function
is t to the yearly production data for ROW (data: diamonds; t: solid line), and a double-
logistic function is used to describe the production of OPEC (data: squares; t: solid line);
parameters from the ts are given in the text.
are [Q1 = 1035  36 Gb, b = 0:059  0:002 yr 1, tp = 1999  1; R2 = 0.991.]
The data and the t are shown in Fig. 3. The production data for OPEC show
a signicant decline in the aftermath of the oil embargo and energy crises of
the 1970s. To simulate the historical record, we will t the data for OPEC oil
production to a double logistic function, with results also also shown in Fig. 3.
For this t to the data we nd two values each for Q1, b and tp, those values
being (102 12 Gb, 0.27 0:03 yr 1, 19741) and (830 120 Gb, 0.058 0:005
yr 1, 20154), with R2 = 0.986. It should be noted that the logistic curve
cannot be expected a priori to reproduce the discontinuities seen in historical
production due to political events. In eect the function will represent the
available capacity for production, which might fall below its maximum level
at any given time, as discussed in more detail by other authors (Reynolds and
Baek, 2011). Here, we use a double-logistic as a means of improving the estimate
of ultimately recoverable oil given past disruptions.
We also t an exponential growth curve to production data for Canadian oil
(Tar) sands, based on data from the Canadian Association of Petroleum Pro-
ducers (CAPP, 2010). For oil sands, the logistic curve is not used, assuming
that production is not near a peak, and therefore still in the early growth phase.
For data covering the past 30 years, the growth rate is 0.078 yr 1, with projec-
tions from CAPP for slower growth rates in the future to 2030, which will be
useful as a guideline in what follows.
With these data as a starting point, two separate analyses are carried out.
In the rst, a deterministic model is used to reproduce historical production
patterns using a combination of logistic curves for conventional oil and for en-
hanced oil recovery (EOR), deep-sea and Arctic oil, heavy oil and tar sands, and
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for shale oil. Industry and historical data (API, 1959; CAPP, 2010) show that
early growth rates of new petroleum sources (aggregated by type or region) are
below 10%; we use this stylized fact as an input to the logistic function model,
along with estimates for resource amounts. The second analysis is an optimiza-
tion problem for minimizing overall production costs during the lifetime of the
production cycle, constrained by the actual production data history. The same
regions and oil types are used as above. Production estimates for the next half-
century are made from these models, based on the fact that the logistic curves,
once the input parameters are determined from past production, provide a de-
terministic path going forward. In addition, we include as xed quantities the
production of natural gas liquids and of biofuels, as projected to 2030 (BP,
2012) and then extended at the same exponential rate to 2050. Under these
assumptions, production of natural gas liquids increases from the current level
of 3.1 Gb/a to 6.6 Gb/a in 2050 (2.0%/year); biofuels production increases from
0.8 Gb/a to 5.0 Gb/a in 2050 (5.0%/year).
Since it was determined above that tting logistic curves to the yearly pro-
duction data is marginally better than using other forms, this same procedure
is carried out for world production, assuming the double-logistic function for
OPEC production. For the rest of the world (ROW) the data are t to a single
logistic-derived function. The total URR of conventional oil, including EOR
and Arctic resources, is approximately 2500 Gb, which lies between the USGS
95% and 50% probability estimates.
3. Deterministic Model
The rst model uses the logistic ts obtained in the previous section, to-
gether with data for non-conventional and other resources, to project potential
future production. Fig. 4 shows the two main resources, crude oil from \OPEC"
and from \ROW" starting out individually with an exponentially growing yearly
output, which then slows and begins to decline, in accord with their respective
total resource amount. Other resources are included in Fig. 4 as well, each
showing its own logistic production prole. Table 4 gives the data used for total
resources, growth rates, and peak dates for the curves in this model, including
the alternative cases to be discussed below. Current world production of con-
ventional oil, including enhanced recovery, polar and deep water resources, has
remained at at 27 Gb/a from 2005-2011.
Two main points characterize the production curves shown in Fig. 4. First, if
one assumes the logistic curve parameters found from the nonlinear least-squares
t, then future production is determined from the initial production pattern. For
the curves shown in Fig. 4, the modeled yearly production quantities agree with
actual data to within 10% over most of the past century. Second, given that new
sources of petroleum, as evidenced by both past conventional production and
current growth in oil sand production, do not grow during the exponential phase
at more than 6%-8% per year, production curves such as the ones shown in Fig.
4 will result. Although there may be large conventional and non-conventional
resources available \in the ground", the logistic model indicates that rates of
10
Variable ROW OPEC1 OPEC2 Arctic EOR Tar Shale
URR (Gb) 1035 102 830 200 400 1000 1000
Baseline: b (%/yr) 0.059 0.27 0.058 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
tp (year) 1999 1974 2015 2100 2100 2085 2125
Fast growth, (%/yr) 0.059 0.27 0.058 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
tp (year) 1999 1974 2015 2075 2075 2060 2100
High URR (Gb) 1350 102 1070 200 400 1000 1000
tp (year) 2009 1974 2025 2100 2100 2085 2125
Costmin (2007$) 5 5 5 30 30 35 50
Costmax (2007$) 40 30 30 100 80 65 110
Table 4: Input parameters for the multiple logistic curves in the deterministic model. Not
included in the table are the data for natural gas liquids and biofuels
production increase, combined with depletion of conventional reserves, are not
sucient to prevent a long period ( two decades) of supply constraints.
The logistic production function for non-conventional resources depends on
all three parameters, Q1, b, and tp. To test the sensitivity to both tting and
free parameters, we examine two additional cases. First, we keep the same URR
in accord with IEA estimates and the logistic curve ts, but change the growth
rates to 10%/yr for all future resources (EOR, Arctic, oil shale) and for oil sands.
The peak year is chosen to ensure that production from these sources either
matches current production (oil sands) or is negligible at present, corresponding
to the fact that the other resources are not currently produced commercially.
The results for the production curves are shown in Fig. 5a. Production does
increase starting in about 2030, after two decades of either declining production
or slow growth, but one would have to construct a scenario in which 20 years
of at or decreasing production would not lead to dramatic changes to the
transportation sector away from just these liquid fuels. Furthermore, it must
be realized that the scenario presented here results in yearly production of oil
sands in 2035, for example, that is three to four times that projected by the
industry itself (CAPP, 2012).
As a second sensitivity test, we increase the estimated URR for conventional
resources by 30%, reverting to the growth rates for future resources used in the
baseline case. Fig. 4b shows the production curves in this case - production
of all liquid fuels remains essentially at through out the time horizon to 2050,
after which it will again increase. Given the close correlations between oil con-
sumption and economic growth seen historically, a decrease in oil supplies over
such a long period could imply potentially severe consequences for the world
economy (Kaufmann et al., 2011; Hamilton, 2009).
Even in the \optimistic" case shown in Fig. 5a, the currently observed
plateau in world oil production is reproduced EIA (2011). (Since 2005, world
total liquids production has increased only slightly, and conventional crude oil
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Figure 5: Yearly historical and potential future production (Gb/a) from multiple logistic
curves for all resources a) Rates of growth for all future resources are 10%/year. b) Enhanced
URR, growth rates for all future resources at 6%/year.
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production has remained at.) The declines or plateaus seen in total production
extends for 20-40 years in these model result. Production weakness is not a sign
of an absolute peak in resource availability, but rather one of rates of extraction
of those resources. The question remains as to whether, after a long period of
production decline and price increases, there would be substitution possibilities
that would then obviate the need for the nonconventional resources in the long-
term. In the slow-growth case, the decline, although once again not absolute, is
even deeper and lasts longer.
We now turn to estimates of marginal and average extraction costs, again
using this multiple-logistic curve model as a starting point.
4. Marginal Extraction Costs
Referring to Fig. 2 with current cumulative production of conventional oil
being 1100 Gb, one might expect a marginal barrel cost of under $20. We
can utilize the estimates made by IEA for the range of marginal extraction
costs across a given resource type to construct a more realistic extraction cost
curve for the production history observed thus far. We assume a linear increase
between minimum and maximum extraction costs (given in constant 2008USD)
from beginning to end of extraction for each individual resource type or region.
Thus, for example, oil sands, with a total resource of 1000 Gb, are estimated
to have extraction costs ranging from $ 35/barrel to $ 65/barrel. There is a
strong overlap between resources with diering marginal extraction costs; if
world oil markets were maximally ecient, and if the given data from IEA were
known to be absolutely accurate, then the cheapest resources would be used
rst, followed by the next most expensive, etc. Furthermore, for this ecient
path to be followed, it would be necessary for a producer to use a given, less-
expensive, resource in a very unrealistic way, extracting at a nearly constant
rate up until complete exhaustion of the resource. However, since none of these
conditions hold, and most importantly, because we are postulating a logistic
production trajectory for each resource type or region, it is clear that some
more expensive resources will necessarily be tapped before the less-expensive
ones are fully depleted. This dynamic leads to increases in marginal extraction
costs at earlier times (or quantities of cumulative resource extraction) than
might otherwise be expected.
In Fig. 4b we show the marginal extraction cost curve for the production
curves in Fig. 4a. As described qualitatively above, there are discontinuous
jumps in the marginal extraction cost each time a new, more expensive resource
begins production. Since the logistic curve itself never goes absolutely to zero,
we set a threshold of 0.1 Gb/yr at which the given resource contributes to the
marginal cost curve. For example, one might consider the earlier, very low
levels of production of a resource as a research phase, such that costs per barrel
as related to actual market prices play a secondary role. With that caveat, to
which changes the form of the extraction cost curve is insensitive, we see that the
dierence between the average cost per barrel produced and the extraction cost
of the most expensive barrel produced, can be quite signicant. The average
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cost is calculated by taking the marginal cost per barrel for each type multiplied
by the production of that type, and divided by the total production for the given
year. For the range over which historical production is important, average costs
per barrel follow rather closely the linear function shown in Fig. 2. As a point
of reference, we have also included in Fig. 4b data points for actual prices of oil
(BP, 2010) in real dollars. We see that some key features of the actual petroleum
system are indeed captured here; for example, although average extraction costs
remain relatively low, to satisfy demand some more expensive resources must
be tapped even at relatively early stages of the production history. In Fig. 4b,
although the extreme spikes in prices are not fully captured since there are many
factors beyond extraction costs that contribute to nal market prices, there is
a rough correspondence to the historically observed jump to a higher cost level
starting in the 1970s at about 500 Gb of cumulative extraction, with another
jump occurring at around 1000 Gb, depending on whether slow or fast growth
rates are considered.
To briey summarize the results thus far, a model of logistic growth patterns
for dierent conventional and non-conventional oil resources can reproduce the
observed pattern of past oil consumption. Growth rates for new resources and
technologies are observed to be less than 10%/year; using this observation of
historical trends as a constraining input to the deterministic model, the growth
in production of nonconventional resources is not fast enough to make up for a
decline in conventional oil production. The net result is a (temporary) decline
in overall production that might last for decades; it is dicult to imagine that
a new surge in production illustrated in Fig. 5a would actually take place,
since substitution possibilities would have been developed in the intervening
period. Finally, marginal costs of extraction, and therefore market prices, can
be shown to rise signicantly more rapidly than average extraction costs due
to the necessity for pulling forward more expensive resources, even if there are
remaining reserves that are less expensive to extract.
5. Optimization Model
Our second model for investigating production limits in the petroleum sys-
tem takes a dierent approach, by posing a question of optimization over time
for production of dierent resources. A motivation for this approach, although
idealized, is that the role of the IEA is exactly that of providing forward-looking
information to member countries (and thus providing by default equivalent in-
formation to anyone accessing their reports) about the characteristics of the
energy system. The procedure used for the results presented in this Section is
based on the same data from the IEA used in Sec. 3 and posits an ecient use of
what is taken to be reliable data. An optimization algorithm was programmed
using the General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) to minimize the total
cost of production over time (1860-2010) using dierent amounts of oil from
various sources. A constraint is imposed, namely that of the logistic curve for
cumulative production, such that the yearly production starts at an exponential
rate, peaks, then falls toward zero again as the URR is reached. Again, since
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the logistic curve has three free parameters, an examination of historical pro-
duction records can help restrict the range of some parameters. As discussed at
length in Sec. 2, logistic and exponential ts to data for conventional oil and oil
sands production, respectively, give a robust starting point for understanding
the dynamics of the system. For resources that have yet to be produced, we use
IEA data as a guideline.
The general procedure used for the optimization was as follows: the URR
for each resource was set to a xed value, based on parameter ts to past
production and IEA estimates. Sensitivity was tested by choosing dierent
URR values. The parameter for initial exponential growth, b, was a variable to
be determined through the optimization process. A delay was introduced for
all resources except \ROW" to ensure that, as observed historically, resource
extraction starts in the proper sequence. Using the marginal costs for each
resource, based on the IEA estimates, the optimization searches for a path
through time such that total costs of extraction over the whole time period of
1860 - 2010 (or 2030) are minimized. We also varied the functional dependence of
marginal extraction cost on cumulative production, using either a linear increase
or a quartic dependence to simulate a rather sudden increase in costs after a
gradual initial increase.
One additional constraint imposed on the solution was that the production
capacity (sum of all the Hubbert curves) was necessarily larger than the observed
production for each year in the historical record. Eectively, this model aims
to merge the ideas of the purely geological version of the Hubbert curve with a
possible economic optimization scheme, using historical data as a guideline. The
optimization nds the minimized extraction costs over time, and the resulting
combination of Hubbert curves can be compared to historical data.
Results from a baseline case, along with a comparison to production curves
and marginal extraction cost curves, will be the focus of this section. Additional
questions may be addressed through this model as sensitivity analyses. The
role played by a lack of foresight can be seen by looking at two cases, one for
which projections of production by IEA into the future are taken as a \given",
and a second one for which only production up to the present is used in the
optimization routine. We also investigate the eect on production if there is an
overestimate of actual OPEC resources, as many in the \peak oil" community
claim.
5.1. Large Resource Base
We rst present results from our baseline case, for which we assume URR
and extraction-cost ranges as shown in Table 5. Values for the URR are taken
from the least-squares ts and are identical to those used for the deterministic
model in Sec. 3. For this trial we use both past production and projections
for future production to 2030. This experiment represents an optimization for
world oil producers of dierent resources who know not only past oil production
patterns, but also plan as if they knew future demand (from IEA data and
projections) and can estimate the extraction costs for both conventional and
non-conventional reserves and resources. The minimization routine for total
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extraction cost over the whole time range 1861 - 2030 yields the growth-rate
parameter for each resource, with output parameters from the optimization
shown in the last row of Table 5. In Fig. 6a are shown the yearly production
curves for the period used for the optimization. Using the parameters from
the optimization, the logistic curves are determined for the future as well; the
extrapolation of the logistic production curves to 2100 is included in this gure.
Variable ROW OPEC1 OPEC2 Arctic EOR Tar Shale
URR (Gb) 1035 102 830 200 400 1000 1000
Costmin (2007$) 5 5 5 20 30 35 50
Costmax (2007$) 40 30 30 100 80 65 110
Growth rate 0.077 0.100 0.092 0.083 0.088 0.075 0
Table 5: Input and output parameters for the \Large OPEC resource base" experiment.
There are several interesting points to note in these results. It is clear that
the heavy reliance on the relatively inexpensive ROW and OPEC resources leads
to a delay in exploitation of the non-conventional and more expensive resources.
The result is that total world oil production, while reaching a maximum around
the middle of the century, shows a lower local maximum around 2020; even the
growth of three dierent alternative sources of oil, i.e. from the Arctic, from
Enhanced Oil Recovery and from oil sands, cannot completely and in a timely
fashion compensate for the decline in conventional oil production. This dynamic
is very reminiscent of the actual history of oil production in the United States,
where even the rapid growth of Alaskan North Slope production in the 1970s
could not do more than partially compensate for the decline in production from
the continental U.S.
Three results from this optimization process reect aspects of observed dy-
namics in the petroleum system. First, the optimized production rates are all
between 6% and 10%, as seen in reality. There is no a priori reason that the op-
timization routine should have settled on values in this range, as the upper limit
was not specied. Second, the delays that come about from optimizing overall
system costs, together with the modest production growth rates, can lead to
periods of time at which production actually decreases. This will be discussed
further in Sec. 6. In addition, these curves also reect the currently observed
trend toward OPEC becoming ever more dominant in total oil production in
the future. Finally, in Fig. 6a we note those points in time at which actual
consumption meets the multi-logistic curve envelope; these are points in time at
which very high oil prices were experienced. For an interpretation of this point,
see Ref. (Reynolds and Baek, 2011)
Fig. 6b illustrates a marginal extraction cost curve corresponding to the
production path shown in Fig. 6a. The dashed line is again an estimated curve
based on Ref. (IEA, 2008). As described above in Sec. 2, we assume a linear
increase of extraction cost across each resource, starting from costmin as given
in Fig. 2, and increasing to costmax. By taking the maximum-cost resource
16
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Figure 6: a) Yearly production of conventional and non-conventional sources of oil with min-
imized production costs based on imputed resource size from logistic ts. Parameters for the
logistic curves are as given in Table 5. The time period for production is extended to 2100
using the logistic curve growth parameters found through the minimization routine, where
the necessary supply is assumed known until 2030. b)Marginal and average extraction costs
for conventional and non-conventional oil production, as a function of cumulative production
in Gb. Upper curve is the marginal cost per barrel; discontinuities represent new, more ex-
pensive resources undergoing production. Lower, dashed curve is the IEA projected marginal
cost, as constructed from the curve in Fig. 2. Dotted curve is the average extraction cost per
barrel, calculated from the logistic-curve production amounts of each resource, together with
their respective marginal extraction costs.
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\produced" by the model at each time step, we construct the curve in Fig.
6b. From the total amount produced for each resource, along with the given
marginal extraction cost at that time step, an average cost per barrel can be
calculated as well. Once again we see that as a new, more expensive, resource
is tapped, and given the pre-condition that this marginal barrel will be needed
to satisfy demand, the implication is that one can expect to see prices rise, and
not necessarily in a slow, smooth manner. Such discontinuities would likely
be smoothed in reality, but the general feature supports our hypothesis that
the average cost of extraction, or assurances that cheap deposits of oil are still
available, will be an unreliable indicator of relative scarcity, since one would
expect that the marginal barrel cost sets the market price, as determined by
demand and supply availability from the various resources. In the marginal cost
curve as shown in Fig. 6 we also observe the feature that there is a time period
during which average costs of extraction actually decrease, whereas marginal
costs are increasing. This dynamic is the result of the competition between
increased production of relatively inexpensive \OPEC oil, while at the same
time there is a need for additional smaller quantities of oil from more expensive
sources.
The results of this trial, using the URR values found from ts to actual
production curves, lead to some overall features that do not correspond well
with historical observations. For example, OPEC production as a fraction of
total world production is too low for the entire historical period to date. The
interpretation of this result, within the framework of our modeled system, is that
a minimal total extraction cost over time would have been to produce more of
the ROW resource, then OPEC, followed by production of the more dicult
and expensive resources such as EOR, Arctic and Tar. In this trial, and given
the limited \knowledge" to 2030, the oil shale resource is not tapped at all; one
would argue that, as the overall peak in production is neared sometime before
2070, that additional resource would come into production as well, all else being
equal. Not surprisingly, the optimum over time was not followed, but part of
the issue is that the world started out ineciently, by not having discovered the
cheapest Middle East resources rst.
5.2. Lower Resource Base
Another experiment has the same costmin and costmax parameters as the
previous one, but a lower URR for both ROW and OPEC, 800 Gb and 900 Gb,
respectively. All parameters, along with the resulting logistic growth rates found
from the minimization routine, are shown in Table 6. From Fig. 7a we see that
the peak in total world production of oil occurs slightly earlier compared to the
previous example, and occurs at a higher yearly production level. However, the
smaller resource of less-expensive, ROW and OPEC conventional oil is depleted
more quickly, and in an optimization routine with foresight, producers know that
they will have to start extracting oil from more-expensive and non-conventional
resources at an earlier point in time than they would have to do if they could
rely on a large, inexpensive OPEC resource base.
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Figure 7: a) Yearly production of conventional and non-conventional sources of oil with mini-
mized production costs necessary to ensure observed supply patterns in the past. Parameters
as in Fig. 6, except that the URR for ROW and OPEC are assumed to be 800 Gb and 900 Gb,
respectively. b)Marginal and average extraction costs for conventional and non-conventional
oil production, as a function of cumulative production in Gb. Upper curve is the marginal
cost per barrel; discontinuities represent new, more expensive resources undergoing produc-
tion. Lower, dashed curve is the IEA projected marginal cost, as constructed from the curve
in Fig. 2. Dotted curve is the average extraction cost per barrel, calculated from the logistic-
curve production amounts of each resource, together with their respective marginal extraction
costs.
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Variable ROW OPEC1 OPEC2 Arctic EOR Tar Shale
URR (Gb) 800 200 700 200 400 1000 1000
Costmin (2007$) 5 5 5 20 30 35 50
Costmax (2007$) 40 30 30 100 80 65 110
Growth rate 0.066 0.136 0.095 0.084 0.083 0.089 0
Table 6: Input and output parameters for the \Low Resource Base" experiment.
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Figure 8: a) Plot of yearly production of conventional sources of oil only. Parameters as in Fig.
7, with the URR for ROW and OPEC are assumed to be 800 Gb and 900 Gb, respectively.
b)Fraction of world oil production due to OPEC, as a function of time. The model with lower
total URR reproduces the actual history in a broad sense. c) Actual oil price, as well as
marginal and average costs, as calculated from the optimization model.
The extraction-cost curves shown in Fig. 7b show roughly the same char-
acteristics discussed in Section 5.1, with overall higher costs determined from
this minimization experiment. This result is not surprising, given both that
the OPEC resource is smaller, and therefore reaches the higher end of its cost
spectrum earlier, and that additional, higher-cost resources are tapped earlier.
As was the case for the deterministic model of production, a temporary de-
crease in production capacity is in evidence in the output from the optimization
model. However, actual production does not necessarily decrease, as seen in Fig.
7. Note, however, that this scenario implies that oil producing entities take seri-
ously the long-term projections for demand, that investments in infrastructure
are made in a timely fashion, and that optimistic assumptions are made about
the ability to scale-up production of non-conventional oil and of resources that
require more advanced extraction technology. These are essentially the warn-
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ings that have been given by the IEA over the past few years in various editions
of the World Energy Outlook (IEA, 2009).
In Fig. 8a the production of conventional oil as a function of time is shown,
including the Arctic and EOR components. The results of the optimization ap-
proach serve to illustrate one of the chief characteristics of the peak oil concept,
namely, that the ability of technology and new discoveries to make up for current
supplies of inexpensive oil is limited. Fig. 8a shows that future Arctic resources
to be developed, along with advances in extraction technology as represented by
Enhanced Oil Recovery, cannot make up for declines in other resources. This
result holds although those new resources represent a 30% increase in the ulti-
mate recoverable resource of conventional oil. The production of new resources
proceeds at an exponential ramp-up rate, as matched by historical experience,
that is too slow to make up for the late start of production. The late starting
point is determined in turn by the relatively high abundance of inexpensive,
rst-choice resources.
Although this trial assumes a smaller resource base for conventional oil from
ROW and OPEC than expected from our t to data, results for the expected
production history from the cost optimization routine match the historical
record better than did the results from Sec. 5.1. If the totals from Arctic
and EOR are included, the total of conventional oil resources still falls within
the USGS estimated range of 2000 - 3000 Gb. In Fig. 8b we show the actual
and model-calculated results for the fraction of OPEC production in total world
oil production. This result reproduces, in broad outline, the increase, relative
decrease, and projected future increase, of OPEC shares. The sharp decrease
seen in the historical record due to the politically-induced disruptions of the
1970s, together with the resulting change in eciency and consumption pat-
terns among the largest oil-consumers, are not reproduced in complete detail,
as might be expected from such a simple model.
Finally, Fig. 8c shows the development of the marginal and average ex-
traction costs, calculated from the model, compared to actual oil price, as a
function of time. It is interesting to note that world oil prices do appear to
show almost discontinuous changes between price regimes, accompanied by a
strong overshoot. Prior to the early 1970s, oil prices were consistently within a
band between $10 - $20/barrel; during the 1990s, after the decrease from high
prices, the range was $20-$30/barrel, and for the past four years, prices have
been mainly within the range of $80 - $100/barrel.
5.3. Additional Parameters
Additional experiments were carried out using the same costmin and costmax
parameters but changed the cost increase structure from a linear dependence on
cumulative production relative to URR, to the fourth power or to a quadratic
dependence. The results are very similar to those already shown. The eect of
using a quartic dependence of extraction cost on cumulative production might
be expected to mimic a lack of concern for future supplies, due to the initial
slow rise of the function. This is equivalent to using increases in price as a
sign of impending scarcity, but being mislead because a relatively at price
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trajectory over time gives way to a steep increase as the fraction extraction of
the URR becomes signicant. Overall, however, our experiments show that the
URR itself has the biggest eect on changing output results; to a somewhat
lesser extent, the costmax and costmin parameters also inuence the timing and
production amounts of various resources.
Another set of experiments examines how limited foresight might aect pro-
duction histories into the future. Assuming the full IEA URR numbers and
using only production data to the present (i.e. not the forecasts for future pro-
duction to 2030), leads to an optimization that disregards entirely any need for
EOR, oil sands, or shale oil, and has only a very minor contribution from Arctic
oil. In other words, in the unrealistic case that producers were not looking to
the future, reliance solely on current reserves would not be adequate to avoid a
supply-side bottleneck in the relatively near future.
6. Discussion and Conclusion
The goal of this work is to combine a Hubbert/logistic curve analysis of oil
production with some historically observed data indicating limits on ow rates
and infrastructure build-up. Together with resource data for unconventional oil
we determine that over a wide range of parameters there will likely be di-
culty in maintaining oil supply growth, thereby leading to a potential mismatch
between supply and expected demand. In addition, we show that a smooth,
logistic-type extraction sequence of dierent resources necessarily implies early
commencement of extraction of expensive resources, even when large amounts
of the cheaper resource are still in the ground. This dynamic results in costs
(and thus, prices) climbing more rapidly than might be indicated by a simple
examination of the size of the cheap resource available.
We have not attempted a detailed economic model of supply and demand
Recently, Benes et al. combined a Hubbert linearization model with economic
factors
A common opposing view to that of the logistic-curve analysis of peak oil
is that economic forces will ensure that as prices for oil increase, there will be
greater incentives to explore for and produce oil, be it from conventional or
non-conventional sources. Eectively, the law of supply will automatically lead
to sucient production of conventional oil to satisfy demand at some market-
clearing price. Alternatively, given the need for liquid fuels for the current
conguration of the world's transportation system, as costs of production for
conventional oil rise, substitutes will be found in the form of non-conventional
resources such as tar sands, shale oil, biofuels and liquids from coal and natural
gas. However, the critical point is that the time scales necessary for increasing
production of alternative fuels to levels of consequence with respect to world
demand leads to a potential for lack of supply in intermediate periods leading
to high prices and then to signicant economic disruptions that would induce
further dynamics not present in the models presented here.
Two recent papers by Reynolds are of interest with respect to our own work.
(Reynolds, 2002) uses the logistic curve to model a multi-variate, non-time-
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series version of discovery to take into account economic and technology factors
in oil discovery. His conclusion is that cumulative production is the key driving
variable, and not oil price, i.e. that economic factors play a minor role. This
result lends support to our approach.
In a second paper, Reynolds (Reynolds, 1999) constructs a stylized model
of a mineral market economy that attempts to capture the basic features ob-
served in real fossil-fuel markets. He nds a U-shaped price (or cost) trajectory,
with decreasing costs as technology improves and while the nite nature of the
resource is relatively unimportant, followed by sharply increasing costs when
scarcity eects begin to dominate. Again, this type of analysis, carried out for
one aggregated resource, forms a conceptual basis for our more detailed look at
dierent resources.
One can, however, combine \geology", in the form of the estimated resources
for dierent regions and liquid fuel sources, along with \economics" in the form
of estimated marginal costs of production for those resources through their
respective production histories. With this combination one can construct an
extension of the logistic curve story that provides more useful information about
potential future production pathways, as we have demonstrated above. The
minimization of production costs over time, taken as an input to the model, can
reproduce observed production patterns reasonably well.
The marginal cost curves found here dier qualitatively from those that
would result from extraction according to a Herndahl sequence (Herndahl,
1967). The logistic curve dynamic forces production from successively more
expensive alternative resources earlier than one would expect from the box di-
agram shown in Fig. 2. This dynamic then necessarily leads to a much quicker
rise in oil price as well, since the price will rise as demand keeps rising and
the new, expensive resources are tapped, even as production continues from the
older resource base. Rather than a concave-upward curve indicating slow cost
increases into the future, the results here indicate concave downward marginal
cost curves that often increase more quickly at the beginning, then more slowly
later in the total production cycle. Not only does this reect what is currently
observed, it is what one would intuitively expect from the combined logistic
growth pattern.
A comparison with recent data from the U.S. Energy Information Adminis-
tration (EIA, 2010) indicates that the results presented here for the eects of
marginal extraction costs may be very conservative. In that report the total
upstream costs (nding and lifting) for oil and gas are seen to have increased
dramatically in the past decade. Average worldwide costs for reporting compa-
nies have been around $30/ barrel of oil equivalent; more importantly, marginal
costs have been in the $60-80 range, far higher than projected by the IEA data
we have used.
Knowledge of the size of the resource base is a crucial input parameter to
this model, as shown especially in the comparisons made in Sections 5.1 and 5.2.
Again, those results show that knowledge of the size of the available inexpensive
resource is a determining factor for the timing of a future peak in world oil
production, as well as for the maximum total capacity of conventional plus non-
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conventional sources of production. This conclusion is essentially independent
of the size of the \backstop" resources; if the extraction of these alternatives is
not begun soon enough, they will not be producing at quantities large enough
to make up for the decline in conventional resources. It is essentially this point
that has been made very recently by representatives of the IEA, most formally
in Ref. (IEA, 2008). Paradoxically, when oil prices are relatively low, there is
a disincentive for producers, private or state-owned, to develop more expensive
resource bases. Price increases may come relatively suddenly, as has been seen
in the recent past.
From the models presented in this paper one may conclude that i) although
the total resource base for conventional and non-conventional oil is large, produc-
tion patterns show that there will likely be a maximum ultimately recoverable
quantity, or eective resource, that is signicantly smaller than the resource-in-
place; ii) limited production growth rates for alternative conventional and for
non-conventional resources lead to the necessity of early commencement of pro-
duction for these resources, well before the conventional resource is exhausted;
iii) due to the need for early production of non-conventional resources with rel-
atively high extraction costs, the overall marginal extraction cost curve for oil
tends to rise much more rapidly than average production costs, with the con-
sequence under an assumption of functioning markets that the price of oil rises
in excess of what might be expected on the basis of data indicating very large
remaining conventional resources. These results are consistent with the conclu-
sions of other work, namely, that new liquid-fuel resources are unlikely to play a
major role in supplanting conventional oil in the short-term (Hirsch et al., 2005;
Soederbergh et al., 2007; Kaufmann and Shiers, 2008; de Castro et al., 2009).
Because of the great importance of oil to our economic system, potential limits
imposed by geological factors must be anticipated well in advance of becoming
critical if we are to be able to react eectively to increasing scarcity, without
experiencing economic distress (Hirsch, 2008; Hamilton, 2009; Kaufmann et al.,
2011; Lutz et al., 2012).
Although the models presented here are very simple, they can reproduce
the broad outlines of past oil production history and provide clues as to the
future of oil production. By including some basic cost and economic optimiza-
tion characteristics, these models help form a bridge between the \geology and
\economic arguments about peak oil production. A comparison of model output
to historical extraction data and technology development trends, along with an
apparent ability of the models to roughly simulate the limited planning horizon
of capacity expansion, leads to a conclusion that one may posit an \eective
peak oil production in the near future, while realizing that the peak is not a
measure of absolute scarcity of resources in the ground.
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